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the cost of front runner action is found to be lower for the EU than for China. Regions that delay
their accession to the climate regime face a trade-off between reduced short term costs and higher
transitional requirements due to larger carbon lock-ins andmore rapidly increasing carbon prices
during the accession period.
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Climate change is oneof the great global policy challenges of our
time. It is increasingly recognized that unabated climate change can
lead to large impacts on human societies [1,2]. At the same time,
slow progress in international climate negotiations has given rise to
skepticism about the prospect of global cooperative action on
climate change. Given the scope of the coordination challenge,
emphasis has shifted from global cooperative action to regional
climate action and to the integration of other priorities such as
energy security and development policies. Yet, the quest for amore
comprehensive international climate treaty with binding targets
continues. After a failure at the Copenhagen climate conference in
2009, negotiators agreed on a new attempt to adopt a global treaty
to come into effect by 2020 [3]. Whether the so-called Durban
platform for enhanced action will fare any better than the previous
attempt is highly uncertain. Yet, targeting greenhouse gas emissions
globally has clear advantages. From an economic point of view, it is
most efficient to exploit the cheapest abatementoption in the sector
and region at the margin. It is total global emissions which matter
with respect to limiting atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations and global mean temperature.
Even though the advantages of global cooperation are
evident, theworldmaybe locked intomoderate and fragmented
climate action due to the institutional, ethical and political
challenges posed by the need for international coordination,
transfers and incentives. Recent studies have shown that an
extrapolation of the current national pledges over the 21st
century is likely to lead to warming of more than 3 degrees by
the end of the century and further warming thereafter [4,5]. In
light of this, the present paper aims at investigating how
effective a group of countries might be in leading the way with
stringentmitigation action even if the rest of the world joins the
effort only decades later. There is literature in support of the idea
that in situations of cooperation problems involving a public
good, a leader setting a good example can play a role [6,7]. Such
unilateral climate action might both reduce uncertainty about
the mitigation costs and, at the same time, build credibility,
which is an important element in international coordination
problems [8–10]. In addition, it might also address concerns
related to historical responsibility, frequently raised at the
negotiation tables by developing countries [11].
This paper presents a multi-model exploration of staged
accession scenarios to a global climate regime conducted
within the AMPERE project. It focuses on the EU as a candidate
for pioneering stringent climate action. The EU has adopted a
20% emission reduction target for 2020 relative to 1990 as part
of its climate and energy package [12] and has agreed to
commit to the 20% target in the second commitment period of
the Kyoto protocol. It has established the worlds' largest
emissions trading system and has implemented a number of
additional climate policies at the national level. The EU has also
discussed the unilateral strengthening of its reduction target
to 30% by 2020, and established a “Roadmap for moving to
a competitive low carbon economy for 2050” (short: EU
Roadmap) that envisions 80% emission reduction by 2050 [13].
The main research question is concerned with the stakes of
adopting the EU Roadmap without an international climate
agreement in place. The study considers two opposite possible
outcomes: either the rest of the world makes a transition to an
ambitious global climate regime in the period 2030–2050(Success), or the EU has to return to a more moderate climate
policy reference case after 2030 if it becomes clear that the rest
of the world does not increase its level of ambition (Reconsid-
eration). In particular, we investigate the following questions:
a) In the case of successful staged accession, what are the
climate outcome and the mitigation costs relative to both
the reference case and the ideal case of immediate global
cooperation?
b) In both cases (success and reconsideration), how does the
asymmetry between mitigation efforts by the front runners
and other regions impact regional emissions and costs due to
carbon leakage, technology spillover and carbon lock-ins?
The studyalso explores the caseof a front runner coalitionwith
two major players leading the way. A coalition between the EU
and China was chosen for several reasons. First, China may face
notable climate change impacts, e.g. in the area of freshwater
resources that are already strained in some regions [14]. It thushas
a strong incentive to mitigate climate change. Second, China is
suffering from a major air pollution problem and thus can expect
to reap significant co-benefits from the reduction of fossil fuel use,
particularly coal [15,16]. Third, China is theworld's largest emitter,
and the stringency of its climate action will have a strong impact
on global emissions and the global energy sector. This gives it high
visibility in international climate negotiations. Fourth, China has
been very active in enacting a number of domestic climate and
energypolicies and is expected to adoptmore in the future [17,18].
Although the case of an EU–China coalition does not reflect the
current status of international climate negotiations, a bilateral
dialog on climate policy issues has progressed [19]. Finally, the
investigation of an EU–China climate coalition permits us to study
how the impacts of advanced mitigation efforts differ between
two regions with substantially different economic profiles.
The study builds on a comparison of results from 11
energy–economy and integrated assessment models (IAMs).
Such models have been extensively used to explore mitigation
pathways which meet long-term climate targets (e.g. [20,21]).
Previous energy–economy and IAM intercomparison exercises
have investigated idealized policy settings such as global
carbon tax scenarios [22] and immediate cooperative action
to reach stabilization targets in the range between 450 and
650 ppm CO2e [23,24,25]. Previous exercises have also
reviewed limited policy situationswith constrained technology
availability [24,26] and delayed and fragmented action
[4,23,27,28]. [23] investigated a staged accession scenario
with two groups of countries joining the industrialized
countries over the period 2030–2070. The analysis highlighted
the difficulty to reach stringent stabilization targets in such a
setting. [28] focused on delay until 2020 and identified benefits
for early movers if the long term target is maintained.
This study considers two different long-term climate
targets (4503 and 550 ppm CO2e) as guiding principles for
long term climate action. Contrary to the previous compar-
ison studies on staged accession [23,28], we do not assume
that the climate targets and their associated greenhouse gas
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even if most world regions join the climate regime at a later
point in time. Whereas the early movers contribute their part
to meeting the climate target, the acceding regions harmo-
nize their carbon prices with those of the early movers only
after considerable delay. This delay results in excess emis-
sions compared to immediate global cooperation and thus is
associated with a relaxation of the long-term climate target
depending on the extent of this initial excess.
The assumption of target relaxation due to delay and the
inclusion of reconsideration scenarios constitute a new
contribution to the literature. The scenario setup also allows
us to study the countering impact of greenhouse gas leakage
during an initial period of fragmented action in a dynamic
and long-term setting, thus adding to the literature on
short-term leakage effects until 2020 [31]. In summary, the
study responds to the need for a deeper exploration of the
current climate policy situations in long-term mitigation
scenarios addressing the question of how to bridge the gap
between short-term commitments and long-term aspiration
in international climate policy negotiations.
This overview article is accompanied by a series of papers
exploring various perspectives of the staged accession
scenarios in greater depth. [32] provides an in-depth look
into the energy sector implications and co-benefits of EU
front runner action. [33] explores the leakage effects onTable 1
Participating models in the study. Coverage of low carbon energy supply options is
The classification of models into general (GE) and partial equilibrium (PE) models w
[39].
Model name Institute Equilibrium
concept
Solution
dynamics
Time
horizon
Co
ca
su
[3
DNE21+ [41] RITE, Japan Partial Intertemporal
optimization
2050 Hi
GCAM [42] PNNL, USA Partial Recursive
dynamic
2100 Hi
GEM-E3 [43] ICCS, Greece General Recursive
dynamic
2050 Lo
IMACLIM [44] CIRED, France General Recursive
dynamic
2100 M
IMAGE/TIMER [45] PBL/UU,
The Netherlands
Partial Recursive
dynamic
2100 Hi
MERGE-ETL [46] PSI, Switzerland General Intertemporal
optimization
2100 Hi
MESSAGE-MACRO
[47]
IIASA, Austria General Intertemporal
optimization
2100 Hi
POLES [48] JRC IPTS, EU//
EDDEN, France
General Recursive
dynamic
2100 Hi
REMIND [49] PIK, Germany General Intertemporal
optimization
2100 Hi
WITCH [50] FEEM, Italy General Intertemporal
optimization
2100 Lo
WorldScan2 [51] CPB,
The Netherlands
General Recursive
dynamic
2050 Loglobal fossil energy markets, while [34] reviews the role of
technology diffusion in the electricity sector. [35] investigates
the climate response in greater detail. Individual model
analyses explore the effect of coalition size on leakage
dynamics [36] and add further perspective on leakage effects
via the industry channel [37] and the land use sector [38].
This paper is structured in seven sections. The following
section introduces the scenario design and the participating
models. Section 3 explores the effect of near term climate
policy fragmentation and technology targets on carbon
prices. This is followed by a discussion of global mitigation
stringency and economic costs in staged accession scenarios.
Section 5 provides a regional perspective and focuses on the
trade-offs faced by front runner and latecomer regions.
Section 6 investigates the role of carbon leakage and
technology diffusion in the near term, summarizing a set of
results from the companion papers. Section 7 concludes.2. Methods
The findings of this study are based on a set of coordinated
scenario runs from 11 global energy–economy and integrated
assessment models. It is one in a series of global model
intercomparison studies conducted within the AMPERE pro-
ject. The series also includes a diagnostic exercise [39] and abased on a count of low carbon energy conversion routes presented in [39].
ith low, medium and high response to carbon pricing was also developed in
verage of low
rbon energy
pply options
9]
Land use sector
representation
Coverage of greenhouse
gases
Classification
in [39]
gh MACs for land use
emissions
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
PE-low
response
gh Endogenous land
use dynamics,
afforestation
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
PE-high
response
w MACs for land use
emissions
Kyoto gases GE-low
response
edium None CO2 from fossil fuel
combustion and
industry
GE-low
response
gh Endogenous land
use dynamics
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
PE-high
response
gh MACs for land use
emissions
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
GE-high
response
gh MACs for land use
emissions,
Afforestation
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
GE-high
response
gh None Kyoto gases from fossil
fuel combustion
and industry
PE-medium
response
gh MACs for land use
emissions
All GHGs and other
radiative agents
GE-high
response
w MACs for land use
emissions
Kyoto gases GE-low
response
w MACs for land use
emissions
CO2, CH4, N2O
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meeting long term stabilization targets [40].
2.1. Participating models
The participating energy–economy models and IAMs
originate from Europe, the United States, and Japan and are
listed in Table 1. All models have global coverage with
varying disaggregation of world regions. The set of models
can be broadly grouped into four different categories
spanned by partial (PE) or general equilibrium (GE) models,
and dynamic recursive (myopic) or intertemporal optimiza-
tion (foresight) models. However, models also differ in
numerous other ways. The technological detail in the
energy sector, the substitutability of energy carriers and the
representation of greenhouse gases are other key factors
influencing model results. GDP and population assumptions
were harmonized across models to facilitate the analysis of
model differences (see Section S3.4 in the supplementary
online material (SOM) for further details). The analysis of
model differences is also aided by a set of diagnostic
indicators for model behavior that were developed by [39].
The differences in model structure and assumptions
reflect different choices of modelers on how to best approach
the analysis by mitigation pathways. We want to point out
that this diversity in model structure and assumptions is not
a drawback, but a feature of model comparisons, since it
allows us to explore the associated range of uncertainties.
However, it is important to recognize that the breadth of
assumptions made by this set of models does not necessarily
cover the entire range of possibilities.
The differences in the disaggregation of world regions pose
a challenge for the comparison of results across models.
Following existing practice in previous studies, results are
compared on a set of harmonized regions to which the closest
(set of) native model region(s) is mapped for each model.
Thus it is important to keep in mind that regional results from
different models can refer to somewhat different regional
definitions (see Section S2.2 in the SOM for further details).
Most relevant for this study are deviations for the EU, China
and Rest Of the World (= world without EU and China)
regions. Notably, the EU region of GCAM, IMACLIM and
MESSAGE includes Turkey, and the China region of MESSAGE
andMERGE-ETL includes formerly centrally planned Southeast
Asian economies. Thus, regional EU, China, and ROW results
from these models allow for only a limited comparison with
results from the other models.
2.2. Scenario design
The analysis is based on a set of scenarios that are
characterized by different climate action for front runner
regions – the EU alone or the EU and China jointly – and the
rest of the world. The front runners adopt ambitious climate
policies as early as 2015 (depending on the first model time
step following 2010)while the other regions continue to follow
a reference policy characterized by moderate and fragmented
action. The front runner scenarios hit a crossroads in 2030
where it is decided whether or not their action was effective in
inducing the rest of the world to transition to a global climate
policy regime by 2050. Thus, we can group these scenarios intotwo sets — staged accession and reconsideration (of stringent
climate action) scenarios. The full scenario setup is summa-
rized in Table 2. In the following, we will briefly discuss the
individual scenario classes. Further information on the scenario
design is given in Section S3 of the SOM.
2.2.1. No-policy baseline scenario
The no-policy baseline scenario (Base) represents a coun-
terfactual case in which no future policies dedicated to climate
change mitigation are pursued. Energy policies like fossil fuel
taxes and subsidies that are not related to climate policy may
still apply depending on individual model assumptions.
2.2.2. Reference policy scenario
The reference policy (RefPol) scenario tries to capture
main elements of the current climate policy landscape by
including emission reduction commitments and renewable
or nuclear energy technology targets at the level of 25 world
regions and major emitting countries. The emission targets
are mostly based on the unconditional Copenhagen pledges
of countries. Beyond the 2020 time horizon, regions are
assumed to continue with emission reductions that sustain
their average emissions intensity improvements at a rate that
it is roughly consistent with their pre-2020 action or slightly
strengthened for regions without emission targets until 2020.
The technology targets include renewable energy portfolio
standards and capacity targets for renewable and nuclear
energy that are implemented through minimum capacity
and share constraints, or direct technology policies. As an
exception, the IMACLIM model adjusted regional carbon
prices to achieve the technology targets. All other policy and
input assumptions were unchanged between the no policy
baseline and the RefPol scenario with the exception of the
IMACLIM model. IMACLIM accompanied carbon pricing with
policy measures aimed at controlling the long-term dynamics
of transport-related emissions in all climate policy scenarios
[52], and measures to make labor markets more flexible [53].
A detailed definition of the reference policy scenario is given
in Section S3.1 of the SOM.
2.2.3. Climate policy benchmark scenarios
The benchmark immediate action scenarios aim to reach
atmospheric GHG concentrations at levels of 450 ppm (Sce-
narios 450, CF450) and 550 ppm CO2e (Scenarios 550, CF550)
by the end of the century. Global cooperation toward these
goals starts immediately. Scenarios 450 and 550 include the
technology targets of the reference policy scenario while the
counterfactual scenarios CF450 and CF550 do not. To harmo-
nize targets between models capturing different baskets of
radiative agents and to remove uncertainties in translating
forcing levels into cumulative GHG emissions, models were
provided with a cumulative CO2 budget for the 21st century as
a long-term target (1500 GtCO2 and 2400 GtCO2 for the period
2000–2100 and the 450 and 550 ppm CO2e targets, respec-
tively). Further details can be found in Section S3.2 of the SOM.
2.2.4. Staged accession scenarios
In this scenario set, the EU (or China and the EU, short: CE)
as front runner successfully motivates the other regions to join
an ambitious climate regime in 2030. As a single front runner,
the EU adopts the climate roadmap immediately, while the
Table 2
Scenario design of the AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios.
Carbon price after 2030-50
transition
Reference policy RefPol None Yes All Derived from regional targets (where existing)
No-policy baseline Base None No All None
Climate policy
benchmark 
scenarios
450 450 ppm Yes All Globally harmonized to meet 450 ppm target
550 550 ppm Yes All Globally harmonized to meet 550 ppm target
CF450 450 ppm No All Globally harmonized to meet 450 ppm target
CF550 550 ppm No All Globally harmonized to meet 550 ppm target
Staged 
accession 
scenarios
450P-EU None Yes
EU (front runner) Price derived from EU roadmap targets Globally harmonized price
from 450 scenario
Other regions Regional prices from RefPol
450P-CE None Yes
EU + China 
(front runners)
Price from scenario 450 Globally harmonized price 
from 450 scenario
Other regions Regional prices from RefPol
CF450P-EU None No EU (front runner) Price derived from EU roadmap targets
Globally harmonized price 
from CF450
Other regions None scenario
550P-EU None Yes
EU (front runner) Price derived from EU roadmap targets Globally harmonized price
from 550 scenario
Other regions Regional prices from RefPol
Reconsideration
scenarios
RefP-EUback None Yes
EU (front runner)
Price derived from EU 
roadmap targets
Regional prices from RefPol
Other regions Regional prices from RefPol
RefP-CEback None Yes
EU + China 
(front runners)
Price from scenario 450
Regional prices from RefPol
Other regions Regional prices from RefPol
Base-EUback None No
EU (front runner)
Price derived from EU 
roadmap targets None
Other regions None
Scenario type Short name Global target Tech. targets Regions Carbon price until 2030
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550P-EU) or – as a sensitivity case – no climate policy at all
(scenario CF450P-EU) until 2030. The EU climate roadmap is
specified in terms of −25%, −40% and −80% GHG emission
reductions targets in 2020, 2030 and 2050, respectively,
relative to 1990 (approx.−20%, −35%, and −75% relative to
2005). After 2030, the carbon price converges in all regions,
including the EU, from the 2030 levels to the 450 ppm
(450P-EU/CF450P-EU) or 550 ppm (550P-EU) carbon price in
2050. The 450 ppm and 550 ppm carbon prices are adopted
from the benchmark 450 and 550 scenarios. Prior to the global
carbon price convergence, the rest of he world implements the
reference policy carbon pricing (deduced from the RefPol
scenario) to allow for GHG leakage effects in the period of
fragmented action until 2050. In the case of an EU and China
front runner coalition (450P-CE), both adopt the 450 ppm
carbon price immediately and continue on this trajectory over
the 21st century.2.2.5. Reconsideration scenarios
In this set of scenarios, the front runners are unable to
motivate other regions to transition to a more ambitious
global climate regime, and as a result reconsider their own
stringent mitigation action. Concretely, they transition back
to the reference policy over the period 2030 to 2050, while
the others follow the reference policy throughout the 21st
century (RefP-EUback/CEback). In a sensitivity case, others
adopt no climate policy at all and the EU phases out its
climate action during 2030 to 2050 (Base-EUback).
2.2.6. Implementation of scenario design
8 of 13 scenarios were mandatory to run for all models
(RefPol, Base, 450, 550, CF450, CF550, 450P-EU, RefP-EUback).
The remaining five staged accession and reconsideration
scenarios were optional sensitivity cases. The implementation
of scenarios by participating models is documented in Section
S3.5 of the SOM.
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The GHG concentration, radiative forcing and temperature
trajectories that result from the emissions scenarios in this study
have been calculated with the atmospheric chemistry-climate
model MAGICC [54]. Usually, model comparisons use the
reported forcing and climate information from participating
modeling teams. The approach used here has the advantage of
providing a unified treatment of carbon cycle and climate
system uncertainty – as it has been shown that these factors
differ greatly across models [55] – and offers the possibility to
generate climate information for model scenarios that do not
provide it endogenously. MAGICC generates probabilistic cli-
mate projections based on a multi-variate probability distribu-
tion for atmospheric chemistry and climate system parameters
[56]. The implementation of the approach in the AMPERE
context is described in [35].
3. Fragmented moderate mitigation action
Several regions in the world have adopted some type of
climate policy bynowand/or pledged to reduce their emissions
by 2020. In addition, targets to support the deployment of clean
energy have been implemented in a number of countries.
Ambitious climate action should therefore be measured not
only against a counterfactual baseline without climate policy
(Base scenario) but also compared with a reference case
of regionally fragmented action at the current level of ambition.
The RefPol scenario tries to capture such a reference devel-
opment based on existing or planned policies. It aims to
conceptualize a situation of a continued stalemate in interna-
tional climate negotiationswhere countries continuewith their
currently pursued or slightly strengthened rates of emissions
intensity improvement throughout the 21st century.
As a robust result acrossmodels,we find that counterfactual
baseline emissions continue to rise over the 21st century, while
emissions in the reference policy case peak around 2050 and
return to roughly present-day emissions levels by 2100. This
leads to a radiative forcing in the range of 5.5–6.5 W/m2 in
2100 and rising thereafter.While lower than the counterfactual
no-policy baseline, this is still inconsistent with the goal of
long-term climate stabilization (see also [4,5]). In the near
term, significant reductions in emissions are observed in the
RefPol scenario compared to the Base scenario as a result of
both technology policies and emission targets. Renewable-
based electricity generation in the RefPol scenario is seen to
increase by 10%–50% across all models compared to the
counterfactual scenario in the 2010–2030 period. Despite the
limited time horizon of technology-related policies, in many
models renewable-based electricity generation is still higher in
RefPol compared to Base in the 2030–2100 period, thus
contributing to lowering of emissions in the long term.
The technology targets are also seen to have an impact
on the 450 and 550 climate mitigation scenarios. In the
2020–2050 period, the scale of zero carbon energy is larger in
these scenarios than in the corresponding policy cases where
no specific technology targets are imposed (CF450 and CF550).
However, it is important to note that the differences across the
sets of scenarios are much more limited in the longer term,
thus indicating the dominant impact of strong carbon pricing
signals through the climate target. This is also reflected in thecorresponding investments in electricity supply, which in the
450 and 550 climate scenarios compared to the CF mitigation
cases are found to be higher in the 2005–2050 period but lower
in the second half of the century. These findings are consistent
with a number of studies [57,58] that technology policies
could have an important role with regards to development
and uptake of zero-carbon technologies in the shorter term
but that in the longer term, strong carbon pricing mechanisms
will be necessary to ensure efficient reductions in GHG
emissions.
Fig. 1 compares the level of carbon prices in the year 2030
in the reference policy case across regions. We recall that
carbon prices are imposed in addition to the technology
targets for the year 2020. Large variations in carbon price
projections exist between models. These variations persist
even if carbon prices are normalized to corresponding prices
in the 450 ppm CO2e benchmark scenario. The large model
differences are due to several reasons. First, carbon prices in
the 2020 to 2030 time period reflect the stringency of short
term emission reductions that are required in addition to the
impact of increased clean energy deployment. Both sets of
policies interact in that carbon prices increase the demand for
clean energy and in that technology targets may reduce
emissions. The extent to which carbon prices are affected by
the technology targets depends on model structures and the
availability of mitigation options. Second, carbon prices are
also impacted by the diversity of baseline assumptions
across models, as in regions where emission targets are
defined relative to 1990 or 2005 emissions levels, higher
baseline emissions require more mitigation effort. Third,
different regional definitions associated with the harmonized
study regions may also play a role.
While in regions like China, Russia and – with the
exception of one model – India, RefPol emission targets are
not found to be particularly binding (after including the
impact of technology targets), in other regions like the EU,
Latin America and USA, stringent targets imply high carbon
prices and are found in some models to result in carbon
prices that exceed those of the 550 or even 450 scenario in
the 2010–2030 period. Thus in some models, the short-term
emission targets in these regions exert more pressure than
the long-term global climate targets with their temporal
flexibility.
4. The global perspective: mitigation stringency and costs
of staged accession to a global climate policy regime
This section describes the global outcomes of the staged
accession scenarios in which the EU or the EU and China act
as front runners to induce the rest of the world to eventually
join climate policy efforts exceeding the reference policy. We
compare these outcomes with global outcomes of baseline,
reference policy and immediate action cases. What global
costs and what benefits in terms of avoided climate change
emerge in the staged accession scenarios? And what are the
consequences of inability to persuade others to follow?
4.1. Emission outcomes
As shown in Table 3, the mitigation stringency differs
markedly between staged accession scenarios and the reference
b)
a)
Fig. 1. Carbon price in the year 2030 in the reference policy scenario for different regions. LAM refers to Latin America, MAF to Middle East and Africa. Panel (a)
shows absolute values, and Panel (b) shows relative prices as a fraction of the carbon price in the 450 ppm CO2e immediate action case. The panel includes only
those models that implemented explicit technology policies in addition to carbon pricing. For some regions, GCAM calculates carbon prices that are 2.6 (EU), 1.5
(USA), and 2.3 (LAM) times higher than in the 450 ppm scenario.
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substantially higher cumulative emissions than the staged
accession and immediate action scenarios — particularly
with regards to long-lived CO2 emissions. The gap is already
significant for the period 2010–2050 and widens thereafter.
By contrast, the difference in cumulative emissions between
the 450 and 550 ppm CO2e cases is much smaller.
Staged accession will lead to larger cumulative emissions
than the immediate action benchmark case because it assumes
the global adoption of the identical carbon price by 2050 rather
than today. As shown in Table 3, this delay leads to 225–450 Gt
higher fossil fuel and industry CO2 emissions over the 21st
century. The size of the front runner coalition (450P-EU vs
450P-CE) or the initial level of climate policy in the rest of
the world (450P-EU vs. CF450P-EU) has a smaller impact on
cumulative emissions when aggregated over the entire century,
although clear differences are visible until 2050. Table 3 also
shows that while staged accession to 450 ppm carbon pricing
fails to deliver the full emission reductions thatwould emerge inthe 450 immediate action case, it still reduces emissions more
than in the 550 ppm CO2e benchmark scenario.
If the front runner region cannot motivate others to adopt
more ambitious climate action (reconsideration scenarios),
the emission outcome is mostly determined by the reference
climate policy that is implemented in the rest of theworld and
to which the front runner reverts after 2030. Over the 21st
century, the additional mitigation effort until 2030 in the
front runner region does not have a significant impact on
cumulative emissions relative to the reference case. Thus, in
the case of a failed attempt to achieve stringent global climate
action the climate benefit from initiallymore ambitious action
by some countries is negligible.
4.2. Reductions in global warming
The climate outcome of the different scenarios scales with
the 21st century greenhouse gas emissions budgets. Across
the ensemble of model scenarios, global mean warming by
4 As explained in the methodology section, the climate outcomes of the
scenarios were calculated with the climate model MAGICC6.6. MAGGIC6.6
shows a slightly higher emissions-to-forcing response than most of the
original climate modules of the participating models. Forcing from
MAGICC6.6 is thus, on average, slightly above the indigenous forcings that
were calculated by the participating models.
Table 3
Global GHG emissions, atmospheric concentrations, and temperature outcomes in the baseline, reference policy, immediate action and staged accession
scenarios. The emissions and climate outcomes of the reconsideration scenarios RefP-EUback, RefP-CEback and Base-EUback are very close to the reference policy
(with the exception of emissions until 2050) and are not listed separately. Numbers correspond to the median and the full range across the scenarios (in
parentheses). Temperature values in square brackets include the full climate system uncertainty (2σ range) around a mean climate sensitivity of 3 °C as derived
fromMAGICC for each emissions scenario. All models reported the Baseline, RefPol, 550, 450 scenarios, and all but IMACLIM the 450P-EU scenario. Model samples
for the optional additional staged accession scenarios are smaller: 450P-CE (GCAM, GEM-E3, IMACLIM, IMAGE, MERGE-ETL, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH),
CF450P-EU (GCAM, MERGE-ETL, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH) and 550P-EU (IMACLIM, MERGE-ETL, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH). Note that for the climate
simulations, emissions were harmonized to the same base year using inventories from [59,60].
Scenario Cumulative CO2 fossil fuel and
industry emissions
Cumulative Kyoto gas
emissions
Cumulative CO2 fossil fuel and
industry emissions
Cumulative Kyoto gas
emissions
(2010–2050) (2010–2050) (2010–2100) (2010–2100)
GtCO2 GtCO2e GtCO2 GtCO2e
Baseline 2017 (1843–2295) 2850 (2279–3214) 5926 (5058–8129) 7991 (6400–10333)
RefPol 1761 (1608–1867) 2469 (2032–2623) 4066 (3896–4906) 5493 (4603–6524)
550P-EU 1617 (1461–1675) 2198 (1695–2384) 2285 (1960–2521) 3287 (2584–3619)
550 1380 (1248–1776) 2019 (1460–2420) 2025 (1804–2160) 3251 (2330–3643)
CF450P-EU 1555 (1327–1784) 2250 (1628–2605) 1556 (1267–1767) 2845 (1885–3287)
450P-EU 1418 (1174–1652) 2155 (1500–2289) 1499 (1134–1827) 2756 (1732–3071)
450P-CE 1338 (1055–1619) 2010 (1343–2252) 1341 (1097–1520) 2694 (1562–2793)
450 1092 (975–1627) 1689 (1084–2261) 1116 (913–1320) 2289 (1273–2708)
Scenario CO2e concentrations Temperature change Probability of exceeding 2 °C
(2100) (max) (max)
ppm °C %
Baseline 1153 (1093–1459) 4.4 (4.1–5.3)[3.3–6.9] 100 (100–100)
RefPol 855 (788–938) 3.5 (3.2–3.8)[2.5–4.8] 99 (97–100)
550P-EU 591 (559–639) 2.4 (2.2–2.6)[1.8–3.3] 76 (68–87)
550 573 (546–630) 2.3 (2.2–2.8)[1.7–3.5] 73 (63–93)
CF450P-EU 536 (516–547) 2.2 (2.0–2.6)[1.6–3.2] 64 (50–87)
450P-EU 529 (509–569) 2.1 (2.0–2.5)[1.6–3.1] 60 (46–84)
450P-CE 519 (493–531) 2.1 (1.8–2.5)[1.5–3.1] 55 (35–84)
450 489 (469–532) 1.9 (1.7–2.5)[1.4–3.1] 36 (21–84)
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5.3 °C in the baseline to 3.2–3.8 °C in the reference policy to
2.1–2.7 °C and 1.7–2.2 °C in the 550 ppm and 450 ppm CO2e
scenarios, respectively. For the 550 and 450 ppm CO2e
scenarios, this range of warming by 2100 is generally lower
than the maximum values over the 21st century shown in
Table 3. As shown in Fig. 2 (Panel a), the extent of the peak
and decline behavior of temperature is model-dependent.
The GCAM model shows the largest overshoot because even
in the immediate action cases, it mitigates little in the near
term due to the large-scale deployment of bio-CCS in the
longer term [61]. Year 2100 median warming is at or below 2
degrees in the 450 ppm CO2e case for all models except
GCAM. Due to the inertia in the climate system, the degree of
overshoot is significantly larger in radiative forcing than in
temperature (Fig. S1 SOM). In addition, the overshoot in the
450 ppm CO2e cases is much more pronounced than in the
550 ppm CO2e cases owing to a stronger reduction of GHG
emissions in the 2nd half of the century, including the more
extensive use of negative emissions technologies.
Due to the scenario design, which defines the long-term
targets in terms of cumulative CO2 emissions, the realized
long-term forcing under a given target can differ between the
models. It depends on concurrent reductions of non-CO2 gases,
the assumed development of aerosol emissions (in particular
sulfur) and the degree of overshoot. As can be seen from Fig. S1,
there is considerable spread between forcing outcomes, but they
all are above the nominal 450 ppm CO2e (= 2.6 W/m2) targetlevel to different degrees.4 This translates to temperature
outcomes, with three models (GCAM, MESSAGE, and REMIND)
showing a less than likely chance to stay below the 2 °C target.
Compared to the 450 ppm immediate action case,
staged accession leads to higher temperature outcomes
in the range of 0.2–0.4 °C (450P-EU; Fig. 2, Panel b). The
difference is decreased by 0.05–0.15 °C if the front
runner coalition is large enough to cover a significant
share of global emissions in the early period (the case of
EU + China; 450P-CE). By contrast, models disagree on
whether or not the fact of moderate climate action in the
rest of the world makes a difference (CF450P-EU vs.
450P-EU). The MERGE-ETL model projects a significant
benefit from such moderate action because it finds a large
amount of carbon leakage to the rest of the world in the
absence of such action (cf. Fig. 8). Thus, the importance of
moderate action in the rest of the world hinges on
whether or not it is needed to prevent significant carbon
leakage in the initial period of fragmented action.
Despite those variations, temperature outcomes for
staged accession to a 450 ppm carbon pricing regime remain
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Fig. 2. Global mean warming (Panels a & b) and probability of exceeding two degrees (Panels c & d) from the staged accession and 450, 550 ppm CO2e
benchmark scenarios. The right panels (b & d) show the increase in warming/exceedance probability relative to the 450 ppm CO2e benchmark. In the left
panels (a & c), left bars for a given scenario depict the maximum temperature/exceedance probability until 2100, right bars the temperature/exceedance
probability in the year 2100. Climate response is only shown for models that ran out to 2100 and captured the suite of Kyoto gases. To account for sampling
bias, boxplots in the right panels only refer to the subset of models (large letters) that calculated all staged accession scenarios. Results from other models are
added in small letters.
32 E. Kriegler et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 24–44below the 550 ppm immediate action scenario. In addition,
temperature is declining by the end of the century so that
ambitious long-term targets may still be realized in the 22nd
century. However, the degree of overshoot both in forcing
and to a lesser degree in temperature increases with staged
accession as a direct result of excess emissions prior to 2050
[35]. The increase in overshoot is more significant in the 450P
than 550P staged accession case, adding to the already larger
overshoot in the 450 ppm immediate action case compared
to the 550 ppm case.
An often-used indicator for the consistency of climate
outcomes with the 2 °C target is the probability of exceeding
2 °C during the 21st century [29]. This indicator is particu-
larly sensitive to the extent of overshoot on the order of
tenths of degrees, and therefore amplifies the results
discussed above (Fig. 2, Panels c & d). While the exceedanceprobability ranges between 20 and 50% for 450 ppm immediate
action (with the exception of GCAM, which depicts a strong
overshoot), this probability is increased to 40–75% by staged
accession. The inclusion of China in the front runner coalition
has a noticeable impact on the probability due to smaller excess
emissions before 2050 and smaller overshoot (a reduction of
exceedance probability of 5–10% compared to the EU only
case).
4.3. Mitigation costs
Emission reductions come at a cost in most models. In
general, we expect global direct mitigation costs to rise with
mitigation stringency. However, costs will also rise with
deviations from the idealized immediate action case, in
which emissions are reduced when and where they have
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Fig. 3. Global policy costs for the period 2010–2050 as a function of
cumulative CO2 FF&I emission reductions across policy scenarios. Shown
are net present values (5% discounting) of consumption losses (for
general equilibrium models GEM-E3, IMACLIM, MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE,
REMIND, WITCH, and WorldScan; Panel a) or abatement costs (for
partial equilibrium models DNE21+, GCAM, IMAGE, and POLES; Panel
b). Solid lines connect the immediate action 450 and 550 ppm cases and
dashed lines the staged accessions scenarios with 450 and 550 ppm
pricing for a given model. See Fig. S2 in the SOM for the results for the
period 2010–2100 and the effect of the choice of discount rate.
5 The discount rate depends on the interest rate of capital in the models.
Most models participating in the study used an internal discount rate in the
range of 3–8% per year, with many models choosing a value of 5% per year.
The choice of discount rate can vary over time and sectors in some models.
33E. Kriegler et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 24–44lowest marginal abatement costs. Thus, we expect staged
accession scenarios to have higher costs than immediate
action scenarios for the same level of mitigation stringency.
Fig. 3 brings together these two dimensions by plotting
global net present value mitigation costs, aggregated over the
period 2010–2050, against cumulative emission reductions,
both for the 450 and 550 immediate action cases and
the 450P-EU and 550P-EU staged accession scenarios (the550P-EU was not calculated by all models). Reported values
are direct (or gross) mitigation costs that do not include
the direct benefits from avoided climate damages, or any
co-benefits and adverse side-effects from mitigation action.
It can be seen that mitigation costs rise between 550
and 450, and between 550P-EU and 450P-EU. There are
significant differences between models in terms of both
the levels of costs and the cost increase between 450 and
550 ppm. This can be closely linked to the responsiveness
of models to carbon pricing (Table 2) and, for general
equilibrium models, to the magnitude of the economic
impact they project from higher energy prices [39]. In
addition, cost metrics differ across models. While we
deduced consumption losses relative to the no-policy
baseline from general equilibrium models (Fig. 3a), we
calculate total abatement costs in terms of the area under
the marginal abatement cost curve or additional energy
system costs from partial equilibrium models (Fig. 3b).
Both costs were aggregated in terms of net present value
using a discount rate of 5%, which is in the middle range of
values used in the models.5 It should be noted that cost
numbers are sensitive to the choice of discount rate, and
the SOM explores the impact of different choices within
the range of assumptions made in the models (Fig. S2
SOM). Despite all these differences, the level of costs and
the increase between 450 and 550 ppm appear closely
correlated, so that there is more agreement between
models on the relative increase between the two targets
(a factor of 1.5 to 3.5).
The staged accession scenarios generally have lower costs
than their immediate action counterparts, but they also lead
to lower emission reductions. The efficiency losses from
staged accession can be identified by comparing the two lines
connecting 450 and 550, and 450P-EU and 550P-EU. For the
period 2010–50, some models indeed show higher costs
at comparable levels of abatement effort for the staged
accession scenarios, but the cost differences are rather
limited. Thus, from an intertemporally aggregated and global
perspective, efficiency losses from staged accession appear
small. An important factor for this result is the assumption
that uniform global carbon pricing, i.e. full efficiency, is
obtained as of 2050 in the staged accession scenarios.
However, staged accession scenarios can have a faster rise
in costs during the 2030–2050 period when carbon prices
rise more rapidly in the rest of the world than in the
immediate action cases. This important finding of a trade-off
between lower short term costs and more steeply rising costs
at a later point in time is discussed in greater detail on the
regional level in Section 5.
4.4. Comparing warming reductions and mitigation costs
A global assessment of staged accession has to contrast the
benefits in terms of avoided climate change and the mitigation
costs relative to the reference case of fragmented andmoderate
climate action over the 21st century. Fig. 4 provides such an
6 Cost estimates of reaching national emissions targets for the year 2020
are sensitive to assumptions about short-term economic growth. The
harmonized GDP assumptions used in this study account for the effect of
the ﬁnancial crisis 2008–10 but did not anticipate the ensuing economic
crisis in the Eurozone. The assumed output of EU27 in 2020 is about 5%
higher compared to current economic growth forecasts from the IMF ([62];
see Section S3.4 in SOM).
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34 E. Kriegler et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 24–44overview. Aggregated global mitigation costs and temperature
reductions beyond the RefPol scenario increase withmitigation
stringency. The biggest jump in temperature benefits – a
reduction of warming in the year 2100 by at least 1 degree –
comes from taking up ambitious climate action with global
participation, independent of the choice of 450 or 550 ppm
CO2e, and immediate or staged accession. A further 0.3 to 0.5 °C
in reduced warming are gained by raising the ambition level
from 550 to 450 ppm CO2e. This can be critical if climate
impacts increase strongly in the 2 to 2.5 degree range. Staged
accession to a stringent carbon price path that would be
required for reaching 450 ppm CO2e if all countries acted today
can still deliver considerable climate benefits — approximately
midways between the 550 and 450 ppm CO2e immediate
action cases. In the 450P-EU scenario, global warming is
reduced by 2.1–3.3 °C compared to a situation without climate
policy and by 1.1–1.7 °C compared to the reference policy. On
the mitigation cost side, the largest difference is between the
choice of 450 or 550 ppm CO2e, independent of immediate
action or staged accession, owing to the non-linear increase of
mitigation costs withmitigation stringency.With the exception
of IMACLIM and IMAGE, the additional costs over RefPol are
projected to increase by a factor of 2 to 3 when moving from
550 ppm to 450 ppm CO2e. Staged accession to 450 ppm
carbon pricing leads to cost reductions of 10–35% from a global
net present value perspective. However, as pointed out above
and further discussed in the next section, staged accession can
have higher transitional cost increases despite its lower
mitigation stringency.
5. Regional perspectives on staged accession
This section explores the regional implications of staged
accession and failure scenarios in greater detail. We investi-
gate two main questions: what are the costs for front runner
regions when embarking on stringent early climate action?
And what are the trade-offs for latecomer regions that delayaccession to a global climate regime? The section focuses on a
regional breakdown between the front runner regions
(Europe, and in one scenario also China) and the Rest of
World (ROW). It should be kept in mind that models differ
somewhat in their native region definition of the EU and
China (see Section 2 and SOM). Despite these limitations, a
comparison of mitigation costs and emissions in front runner
vs. ROW regions is feasible.5.1. Regional mitigation costs in reference and benchmark
scenarios
Regional mitigation costs in the immediate action scenar-
ios are considerably higher in the second half of the century
than in the first due to the cumulative impact of mitigation
policy (Figs. 5 and S3). However, this needs to be put into the
context of the assumption of a 12-fold increase of gross world
product in purchasing power parity between 2005 and 2100
that was adopted by all models for the baseline case (SOM).
As a consequence of this rise in mitigation costs, models
estimate significantly higher long run costs for immediate
action on the 450 ppm CO2e target than for weak action in the
reference policy case. For the nearer-term mitigation costs
until 2050, this is still true for ROW, while the picture for the
EU is mixed. A few models show similar costs in the reference
policy than for immediate action for the period 2010–50,
indicating amongother things, inefficiencies from implementing
domestic EU emission reductions in combination with technol-
ogy targets in these model setups.6
a) Regional mitigation costs for the
period 2010-2050
b) Regional mitigation costs for the
period 2050-2100
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Fig. 5. Regional mitigation costs for (a) the period 2010–2050 and (b) 2050–2100. Shown are net present value consumption losses (discounted at 5%; relative to
baseline consumption) for general equilibrium models (Ge = GEM-E3, Me = MERGE-ETL, M = Message, R = ReMIND, W = WITCH, and Wo = WorldScan)
and abatement costs (relative to baseline GDP) for partial equilibrium models (I = IMAGE, D = DNE21+, P = POLES). The figure includes only those models
that report mitigation costs for the staged accession and reconsideration scenarios with the EU as front runner (450P-EU and RefP-EUback). ROW includes China.
35E. Kriegler et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 24–44While reference policy costs for ROW are lower or of
similar magnitude as for the EU, they are higher in the case of
immediate action by a factor 1.5 to 5.5. Higher than average
mitigation costs in the developing world have been identified
in other studies before, e.g. [63]. Among other things, this is
due to higher carbon intensity and larger emission reductions
from a strongly rising baseline in these countries. It is
important to note, however, that these are cost estimates in
the absence of burden sharing mechanisms where, for
instance, countries with below-average mitigation effort
would compensate other countries with larger effort [64].
The effect of burden sharing schemes on net mitigation costs
has been studied in other model comparison exercises
[27,63] but was not a subject of this study. Apparently,
burden sharing mechanisms will be needed in the medium to
long run to establish political acceptability for a global
cooperative solution that utilizes the least costly mitigation
potentials at the margin independently of where it occurs.
5.2. The stakes of front runner action faced by the European
Union
The impact on mitigation costs of the EU acting as front
runner can be measured against the costs in the reference and
immediate action scenarios, which epitomize the boundary
cases of no front runner and everybody being a front runner. As
shown in Fig. 5, the long run costs (2050–2100) of the EU for
leading theway to a global 450 ppm pricing regime (450P-EU)
are very similar to its immediate action costs. Until 2050,
models vary in their estimate whether staged accession would
be more or less costly for the EU compared to immediate
action. This depends on whether or not they see unilateral
roadmap action until 2030 followed by a gradual transition to450 ppm carbon pricing as more stringent than the 450 ppm
immediate action which would allow the EU to fully benefit
from emission reductions elsewhere.
In the reconsideration scenario (RefP-EUback), the EU
transitions back to its reference policy after 2030 when
recognizing that the rest of the world will not adopt more
ambitious climate action. Models disagree about the cost
mark-up due to front runner action in the period 2010–2050.
Those that see the roadmap action in 450P-EU as similarly
costly or more costly than immediate action until 2050 also
show significant cost mark-ups due to failure in RefP-EUback
compared to the reference policy. If inefficiencies in front
runner action are significant, sunk costs due to failure are
obviously also significant.
For the EU, other economic considerations may play an
equally important role for the evaluation of whether or not
the EU should act as a front runner on ambitious climate
action. Such considerations may include energy security,
trade and competitiveness, as well as external environmental
and health costs unrelated to climate change. [32] takes a
closer look at potential co-benefits for the case of Europe
unilaterally adopting stringent climate action in the form of
the EU climate and energy roadmap. A robust result from all
models is that climate action in Europe leads to higher energy
efficiency, higher utilization of renewable energy, and a
diversification in the supply of energy, thereby reducing its
dependence on fossil fuel imports and improving energy
security. These findings hold regardless of whether Europe is
able to inspire the rest of the world to join its mitigation
effort or not. The higher overall utilization of low-carbon
technologies in turn reduces the environmental and health
costs of electricity production, mainly due to a reduction of
coal use without CCS in favor of non-biomass renewables.
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Fig. 6. Reduction in global consumption growth over the period 2030–2050 relative to the no policy baseline (for general equilibrium models GEM-E3,
MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE, REMIND,7 and WITCH). Shown are annual average growth rate reductions in percentage points for the 450 immediate action and staged
accession scenarios and for three world regions, EU, China and ROW (excluding China). To account for sampling bias, boxplots only refer to the subset of models
(large letters) that calculated all three scenarios. MESSAGE results are added in small letters. Results of the other two general equilibrium models are not
included, because WorldScan did not disaggregate the China + ROW region, and the transient behavior of consumption losses in IMACLIM is heavily influenced
by the addition of infrastructure policies in the climate policy scenarios. IMACLIM does not show a significant variation of consumption growth rates between
immediate action and staged accession scenarios.
7 REMIND includes an intertemporal capital market which allows regions to temporarily adjust their current account position within the constraints that every
region needs to balance its current account at the end of the time horizon, and that current account surpluses and deficits need to be balanced across regions at
each point in time. Consumption growth rate reductions reported for REMIND include changes in the current account position to cancel out temporary transfers
between consumption and current account in response to climate policy [66].
36 E. Kriegler et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 24–44These cost savings from reduced non-climate externalities
due to implementing the EU roadmap may offset a large
portion of the climate policy costs.
5.3. Trade-offs of early and delayed action for China
China is the world's largest emitter with a rapidly growing
economy and a heavily coal-based energy system. This makes
it a key player in the quest for achieving long-term climate
targets. It also affects the trade-offs China faces between the
choice of joining the global mitigation effort immediately or
delaying accession to a global climate regime. The reference
policy costs for China are projected to be low (see Fig. S3 in
SOM) as most models see the carbon intensity target for 2020
being realized by the adoption of the technology policies
without additional need for carbon pricing (see Fig. 1). By
contrast, immediate action costs are higher than the world
average owing to the large mitigation effort that China will
have to undertake in such a scenario. Delaying the adoption
of 450 ppm carbon pricing until after 2030 (450P-EU) can
lead to cost reductions by a factor of 1.7 to 5.2 over the period
2010–2050 based on the ensemble of models that reported
this scenario (at 5% discounting of future costs), while long
run costs after 2050 are largely unaffected (Fig. S3).
However, all models show a steeper increase in mitigation
costs for delayed action (450P-EU) than immediate action
(450) during the 2030–50 transition phase in which the
carbon price is ramped up to 450 ppm pricing levels. A rapid
rise in mitigation costs can bring a number of socio-economic
and institutional challenges. The resulting impact on consump-
tion growth rates as estimated by the general equilibriummodels can provide a useful proxy for the magnitude of
these challenges [4,65], although the modeling results alone
will not be able to capture them fully. Fig. 6 shows the
reduction of consumption growth in China for the period
from 2030 to 2050 across the immediate action and staged
accession scenarios. Growth rate reductions relative to the
baseline range up to an annual average of 0.33 percentage
points in the 450P-EU scenario where China transitions to
a global climate regime only after 2030 as compared to
0.13 percentage points in the immediate action case. The
projected growth rate reductions can be compared with
estimated slowdowns of consumption and GDP growth in
the past and present. For example, the World Economic
Outlook [62] projects EU27 output to grow by only 6.5%
over the period 2008–2017 due to the financial and Euro
crises, and return to post-crisis growth rates of 2% per year
thereafter. Assuming that in the absence of these crises
output in the EU would have grown at a steady 2% per year.
Europe is currently suffering an annual average 1.4
percentage point reduction of GDP growth over the decade
2008–2017. This is an order of magnitude larger than the
reduction of global consumption growth from climate
policy, as projected in this study.
If China chooses to take up front runner action together
with the EU, and others follow onto the path to 450 ppm
carbon pricing after 2030 (450P-CE), its mitigation costs
will be comparable to, or in some models (MERGE-ETL,
WITCH) even higher than in the immediate global action
case over the period 2010–2050 (Fig. S3). The higher costs
accrue mostly in the near term due to balance of trade
effects and larger mitigation efforts assisted by higher
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temporal profile of mitigation costs shifts forward com-
pared to the delayed action (450P-EU) scenarios with a
faster increase before 2030, and a consequently slower
increase in the period 2030–50.
The costs of reconsideration (RefP-CEback) would be
significant in the 2010–2050 period, where they are higher
than for delayed accession (450P-EU). Since China's climate
action in the reference policy is assumed to be very
moderate, a failed attempt to nudge the world into global
cooperative action would imply a considerable amount of
sunk costs due to front runner action up to 2030. Thus, the
stakes of front runner action are higher for China than for
the EU. However, this critically hinges on the assumption
of the level of ambition in the reference policy. If China
chooses to embark on more ambitious climate action
domestically than was assumed in this study, going a step
further to commit to international leadership will pose less
of a challenge. In addition, as for the EU, direct mitigation
costs will not be the only consideration for China when
evaluating its level of climate policy commitment. Given the
significant air pollution and energy security problems that
are caused by China's reliance on fossil fuels and coal in
particular, a reduction of coal use without CCS, which has to
be one of the cornerstones of any effective climate policy,
can bring large co-benefits [15,16].5.4. Trade-offs of delayed action for the rest of the world
The comparison between immediate (450) and delayed
accession (450P-EU) to a global climate regime shows a
trade-off between higher short-term mitigation costs and
higher transitional medium-term mitigation challenges for
the rest of the world, including China if it foregoes front
runner action. Until 2050, ROW has clear benefits in terms
of lower costs from delaying 450 ppm carbon pricing until
after 2030 (a factor of 1.7 to 3.6 lower costs in 450P-EU
compared to immediate action), while long term mitigation
costs after 2050 are of comparable magnitude.
The trade-off of delayed action consists in larger
transitional mitigation challenges in the medium term.
First, mitigation costs are projected to rise more rapidly in
the transition period 2030–2050, as shown by a larger
reduction in consumption growth rates over this period in
the 450P-EU compared to the 450 scenario (Fig. 6). Second,
delayed action can result in a stronger carbon lock-in inFig. 7. Comparison of cumulative coal use (Panel a), fossil fuel and industry
CO2 emissions (Panel b) and carbon price expenditures (Panel c) in world
regions outside of the EU between the immediate action (450) and staged
accession scenarios (450P-EU, 450P-CE). Fossil fuel CO2 emissions after 2070
turn negative in many models and are not included in this figure. WorldScan,
GEM-E3 und DNE21+ have a time horizon until 2050. WorldScan does not
report separate numbers for China, thus its values for ROW constitute the
sum over China and all other regions outside the EU. Carbon price
expenditures in IMACLIM reach 626 trillion (450) and 650 trillion USD
(450P-CE) until 2070 (405 and 401 trillion USD, respectively, until 2050;
sum over ROW and China). For comparison, the undiscounted GDP over the
period 2010–2070 is assumed to be around 7000 trillion USD in China plus
ROW in this study.
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lifetime of fossil-based energy infrastructure creates signif-
icant inertia that prevents rapid decarbonization unless
power plants are retired prematurely, left idle or retrofitted
with CCS [67]. Also, alternative low-carbon technologies
require time to diffuse into the system and ramp up to
significant scale [68]. As a result, the carbon intensity of
energy production may respond only slowly to carbon
prices or other policy or market signals. As can be seen in
Fig. 7, delayed accession leads to higher coal use (Panel a)
and fossil fuel emissions (Panel b) in ROW not only during
the initial period of low carbon prices, but also during
2030–50 where ROW transitions to 450 ppm carbon
pricing, and after 2050 when carbon prices in staged
accession and immediate action cases are identical (see
also [33]). In fact, only the smaller part of excess emissions
over the immediate action case stems from the initial period
until 2030, while the larger part (40% to 80% depending on
the model) accrues thereafter. The carbon lock-in is
significantly increased if China delays the adoption of
stringent carbon pricing together with the rest of the world.
As carbon prices rise steeply to 450 ppm levels after 2030
in ROW, so does the carbon price expenditure, i.e. the amount
paid for residual emissions (= carbon prices times emis-
sions). As can be seen from Fig. 7c, the magnitude of carbon
price expenditures in ROW and China is large in all climate
policy scenarios, with the largest part occurring after 2030 (in
undiscounted terms). Most models project that the 2030–70
carbon price expenditure in ROW and China is further increased
by the carbon lock-in from delayed action (by −2 to 32 trillion
USD, or−4% to 74%, for 2030–2070 between 450P-EU and 450).
While the models do not show significantly higher long term
mitigation costs due to the larger carbon tax expenditures in the
staged accession scenarios (Figs. 5, S3), there can be
distributional implications that are usually not well
captured by the type of models used in this study. Since
expenditures accrue as revenues to the state or the
holders of emissions allowances, a larger carbon price
expenditure can increase institutional challenges to
allocate or recycle the revenues (who benefits?). If the
allocation problem is not solved efficiently, this can
translate into higher long-run mitigation costs from
delayed action even if excess emissions in an early period
do not have to be compensated for.8 [31] summarizes the results of the EMF29 model comparison study on
carbon leakage.
9 [71] is based on a single-model framework.6. Carbon leakage and technology spillovers due to front
runner action
An important concern about unilateral climate action is
carbon leakage. Carbon leakage would induce excess emis-
sions in non-acting countries and thus would reduce the
environmental effectiveness of the climate policy. In princi-
ple, carbon leakage can occur in any climate policy regime
with regionally fragmented carbon pricing, such as the
reference policy scenario, but its magnitude is expected to
increase with the carbon price differentials between regions.
Thus, stringent carbon pricing in a front runner region
as considered here may be particularly prone to carbon
leakage effects. This section investigates the driving and
counteracting mechanisms of carbon leakage as well as theprojected amount of leakage in a staged accession climate
policy setting.
The analysis focuses on the near-term period until
2030 and is restricted to the various carbon leakage
channels that are represented in the participating models
(see Table S3 in SOM). All models represent carbon
leakage via the energy market channel, through which
reduced demand for fossil energy in front runner regions
lowers international fossil fuel prices, inducing higher
fossil fuel consumption in other regions. Related to this is
the industry or competitiveness channel, through which
higher energy prices in front runner regions induce
energy-intensive industries to re-locate to regions with
lower energy prices and weaker or no abatement policies.
This channel is represented in the multi-sectoral CGE
models participating in the study (GEM-E3, IMACLIM,
WorldScan). Some studies [69,31]8 argue that the com-
petitiveness channel dominates whereas others [70,71]9
identify the energy channel as the major driver of carbon
leakage.
Carbon leakage can also be triggered by indirect land-use
change emissions if the front runner regions substitute fossil
fuels with bio-fuels that are imported from non-abating
regions. This effect is captured by integrated assessment
models that include a dynamic land-use model such as GCAM
and IMAGE. Finally, early mitigation action can also acceler-
ate the advancement of low-carbon technologies and thus
spill over to other regions that adopt these technologies as
well. This counteracting mechanism to carbon leakage is
represented by models that include endogenous technology
learning and technology spillovers in this study such as
IMACLIM, MERGE-ETL, POLES, REMIND and WITCH. The
varying representation of leakage channels across models
needs to be kept in mind for the cross-model comparison
below. Where appropriate, we report results from individual
models that investigated specific leakage channels in greater
detail.
6.1. Fossil fuel and industry emissions leakage
The aggregate effect of carbon leakage through the energy
and competitiveness channels and technology diffusion in
the period of fragmented action until 2030 is described in
Fig. 8. Fig. 8a shows the results for Europe following the EU
Roadmap, i.e. approx. 35–45% emission reductions by 2030
relative to 1990 depending on the model implementation.
We distinguish two different levels of climate action in the
rest of the world: reference climate policy (RefPol; squares)
and no climate policy (Base; circles). Obviously, the EU
Roadmap leads to stronger emission reductions relative to
the no-policy baseline than to the reference policy case,
which already accounts for approx. 30% emission reductions
by 2030 relative to 1990. Different baseline emission trends
in the absence of climate policy lead to a large range of
emission reductions in the EU across models (MERGE-ETL
has a very carbon-intensive baseline, and IMACLIM and
GCAM include Turkey in their EU model region).
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Fig. 8. Cumulative changes in fossil fuel and industry emissions for the period 2010–2030 in the front runner regions (EU: Panel a and EU + China: Panel b)
plotted against changes in cumulative emissions in the rest of the world. Panel a shows the differences between the CF450P-EU and Base scenarios (circles) and
between the 450P-EU and RefPol scenarios (squares). Panel b shows the differences between the 450P-CE and RefPol scenarios. Dashed lines connect points of
equal leakage rates ranging from 10% to 80%.
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Some models derive increasing emissions whereas others
project emission reductions. The absolute change of emis-
sions is smaller when the rest of the world already follows
moderate climate policy, but carbon leakage rates relative to
EU emission reductions are comparable. Three models,
MERGE-ETL (leakage rate: 49%), GEM-E3 (22%) and WorldScan
(21%), show significant carbon leakage rates against the
reference policy case. The large carbon leakage in MERGE-ETL
is due to higher coal and oil use in the rest of the world induced
by lower fossil fuel prices in combination with higher uranium
demand for nuclear power in the EU. The results in GEM-E3 and
WorldScan reflect carbon leakage via the competitiveness
channel. [37] explores the carbon leakage effect in GEM-E3 in
greater detail. The economy-wide 22% carbon leakage rate is
comprised of different sectoral leakage rates. The highest
sectoral leakage is found in the energy conversion sector and
energy-intensive industries. Among industries, metal produc-
tion and the chemicals sector are found to have the highest
leakage rates. These sectors are characterized by both high
energy intensity and high trade exposure.
Only a subset of models investigated the case where the
rest of the world follows no climate policy at all (indicated by
the circles in Fig. 8a). Again, MERGE-ETL shows the highest
carbon leakage, but the leakage rate relative to the EU
emission reductions, now measured against the no policy
baseline, is smaller (17%). Two models, WITCH (leakage rate:
−23%) and IMACLIM (−9%), show significant negative
carbon leakage. This is due to technology diffusion effects.
In particular in WITCH, the increased deployment of EU wind
power capacity triggers a decrease in wind power costs that
diffuses to the rest of the world; this in turn crowds out some
of the coal power investments within all regions.
Fig. 8b shows the results for the case that Europe and
China adopt the carbon price of the 450 scenario compared
with the reference policy case. The main difference is that thecombined emission reduction is much stronger than if
Europe acts alone. Moreover, while the absolute amount of
carbon leakage to other regions is larger, its magnitude
relative to the strong reductions in Europe and China is found
to be smaller in the majority of models. For example, [37]
found that the leakage rate in GEM-E3 drops from 22%
to 2% in cumulative terms when China joins the GHG
mitigation action because of the increased coalition size and
because shifts of production away from China's highly
carbon-intensive industry may in part be to regions with
lower carbon intensities. Only MERGE-ETL shows strong
positive carbon leakage with the leakage rate increasing to
63%, partly because increased use of uranium by the EU and
China induces the rest of the world to substitute coal for
nuclear power.
Since most models participating in this study comprise a
detailed representation of the energy sector, carbon leakage
via the energy channel can be traced back to re-allocations on
the international markets for coal, oil, and gas. [33] provides a
comparative analysis of energy market leakage across all
models, and [36] performs an in-depth analysis with
REMIND. The studies show that the strength of fossil fuel
leakage differs for coal, oil and gas and across models.
Generally, oil and gas leakage is stronger than coal leakage
because coal trade is relatively small. The general pattern,
however, is one of limited carbon leakage through the fossil
fuel market channel. In several models, the story is even one
of negative carbon leakage as the rest of the world replaces
coal with gas due to reduced demand for gas among the early
movers.
6.2. Technology diffusion
Increased demand for low-carbon technologies in miti-
gating regions can lead to technology learning that in turn
may induce diffusion of such technologies to other regions. In
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ally fragmented policy targets indeed promote technology
innovation [72]. When there are front runner regions that
undertake yet more stringent mitigation action, their energy
sectors are further transformed toward the use of low-carbon
technologies. However, most of the models show that outside
of the front runner coalition, technology deployment in the
electricity sector is not significantly affected and continues
to be determined by the technology and climate policy
objectives in the reference policy. Exceptions exist in the case
of an EU–China coalition, in which the POLES and IMACLIM
models indicate that CCS becomes a sufficiently prominent
option in the front runner regions to induce a learning effect
and technology spillovers [34]. Other models generally show
less technology spillover effects. MERGE-ETL, for example,
suggests nuclear (considered a mature technology) as a
prominent decarbonization option for an EU–China coalition,
hence technology diffusion impacts on the rest of the world
are small, and are overwhelmed by carbon leakage effects if
limited access to uranium induces the rest of the world to
replace nuclear energy with coal. Regarding wind energy
technologies, most of the models show that the reference
policy case already brings about significant technology
learning and high levels of deployment. Given that most
models suggest only limited technology responses to front
runner action from the other regions that continue with their
reference policies, technology diffusion might require dedi-
cated policy instruments.
6.3. Land-use emissions leakage
One modeling team (IMAGE) also looked into the
potential consequences of a land-use channel of carbon
leakage [38]. If single regions like the EU and China move
ahead, they import bioenergy from international markets to
reduce coal, oil, and natural gas consumption. Higher
bioenergy supply is likely to lead to higher emissions from
land-use change (compared to baseline), which leads to an
increase in land-use emissions. [38] finds that pursuing early
action by the EU alone and EU and China together may
somewhat increase land use emissions until 2050. The
prominence of the bio-energy channel differs between
scenarios because the amount of land use emissions, as a
result of increased bio-energy production, varies between
regions from which bioenergy is imported. This highlights
the sensitivity of land carbon leakage to assumptions about
the regional pattern of bioenergy production. More research
is needed to better understand the land carbon dynamics in
fragmented policy scenarios.
7. Conclusions
The current climate policy situation is marked by the
long-term aspiration of stabilizing climate change at or below
2 °C of global warming, but also by fragmented and moderate
short-term action, and by large uncertainty about future
national climate policies and the prospect of an international
climate agreement. A defining question for the way forward
for global climate policy is how to build a bridge between
short-term realities and long-term aspirations. Obviously,
countries are unlikely to commit to more stringent mitigationaction at the international level than what they can support
at the national level. On the other hand, national climate
action requires international reciprocity for reasons of both
environmental effectiveness and stabilizing the expectations
of economic and public actors.
This study contributes to mapping out the climate policy
landscape by exploring how staged accession can constitute
such a bridge. We have investigated how effective a group of
countries can be in leading the way with stringent mitigation
action even if the rest of the world does not join the effort for
two more decades. The analysis has focused on staged
accession scenarios where a front runner coalition – the EU
or the EU and China – embarks on ambitious climate action
broadly consistent with the 2 degree target, and the rest of
the world transitions to the global climate regime between
2030 and 2050. The study adds to earlier work on staged
accession scenarios, in particular the two model comparison
exercises RECIPE [25] and EMF22 [23] that looked at the
achievability of long-term climate targets if a large number of
countries delay the adoption of such targets. Major innova-
tions of this study include the improved representation of the
currently fragmented climate policy landscape with unprec-
edented detail in a model comparison framework; the broad
exploration of the payoffs and tradeoffs for front runner and
follower regions including transitional costs, carbon lock-ins
and benefits in terms of reduced global warming; the specific
investigation of the EU and China in staged accession
scenarios; and an analysis of dynamic leakage effects during
the initial period of fragmented action until 2030. While
previous studies assumed a willingness to adopt the original
target after delay, this study explores the scenario that
long-term climate action would not compensate for the delay
in adopting a global climate policy approach.
The following key findings emerge:
7.1. Environmental effectiveness
Initiating staged accession to an ambitious global climate
policy regime can deliver significant climate mitigation even
if the majority of countries join only after 2030 and the
original climate target is relaxed. Concretely, if front runner
countries can induce others to join a global climate regime
after 2030, then global warming until 2100 is projected to be
reduced by more than 1 degree compared to a reference
policy case of moderate and fragmented regional action over
the 21st century. While the climate benefits from staged
accession are significant, the resulting climate outcome is
unlikely to be consistent with a 2 degree target [35]. Phasing in
450 ppm carbon pricing outside Europe after 2030 leads to
0.2–0.4 °C higher warming compared to the 450 ppm imme-
diate action scenario, and to a 0.15–0.35 higher probability of
exceeding the 2 °C target. This is caused by higher overall
emissions over the 21st century, but also by higher tempera-
ture and forcing overshoot due to the excess emissions until
2050. The addition of China to the front runner coalition can
reduce the pre-2050 excess emissions by 20–30%, which
lowers peak warming by 0.05–0.15 °C and the probability of
exceeding 2 °C by 0.05–0.1 compared to the EU acting alone.
Thus, early action in China has a measurable impact on
warming outcomes. Temperature trajectories in scenarios of
staged accession to 450 ppm carbon pricing show a downward
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be limited to 2 degrees if those trends were continued. If front
runner action fails to nudge the rest of theworld into ambitious
global action, the warming benefit compared to reference
policy will be negligible. Front runner action should therefore
be highly concerned with setting effective examples for others
to follow.
7.2. Economic efﬁciency
Staged accession to a global climate regime induces economic
inefficiencies. In the initial period of globally fragmented action,
regions may have to forego the least-cost mitigation potential at
the global margin due to regional differences in greenhouse gas
prices. While such price differentials can in turn lead to carbon
leakage, on averagewe find this effect to be limited in the case of
EU front runner action until 2030, with leakage rates that
are comparable to [31]. However, a few models show
substantial carbon leakage via coal and uranium markets
[34] and uncertainty about carbon leakage effects through
bioenergy markets [38,73]. Carbon leakage effects, partic-
ularly from the re-location of energy intensive industries,
can be significantly reduced if China joins the front runner
coalition [37].
Models find lower global mitigation costs for staged
accession than for immediate action scenarios (by 10–35%
compared to the 450 ppm scenario), albeit for lower levels of
emission reductions. However, staged accession leads to more
rapidly rising mitigation costs in the transition period between
2030 and 2050 for regions that delay climate action. Themodels
project an additional slowing of consumption growth by up to
0.3 percentage points in these regions. Delayed action also leads
to a continued build-up of fossil fuel infrastructure until 2030
that is only weakly moderated by the low carbon prices during
this period. This result has also been identified in the AMPERE
companion study on delayed action [40,74]. As a result of this
carbon lock-in, the rest of the world continues to have higher
emissions in the long run, even after 2050, when carbon prices
have reached the level of the immediate action case. This in turn
leads to higher carbon price expenditures in the long run, with
the potential for larger challenges to institute climate policy.
Thus, the rest of theworld faces a clear trade-off between higher
mitigation costs in the short term and larger transitional
medium-term challenges with adopting stringent climate
action.
7.3. Stakes faced by front runners
Front runners are faced with the risk that their
additional effort may have been in vain if the rest of the
world chooses not to go for ambitious climate action in the
end. In the case of the EU, the stakes depend on how EU
front runner action compares to the EU reference policy
until 2030. Since the EU is assumed to already follow
relatively stringent climate policies in the reference case,
many models see the EU's stakes not rising by much if front
runner action is adopted.
The stakes for front runner action by China are projected to
be higher than for the EU. However, this critically hinges on the
assumption of the level of ambition in the reference policy. In
addition, both the EU and China will not only consider theirdirect mitigation costs when evaluating their level of
climate policy commitment. Exploiting synergies in terms
of reduced air pollution, increased energy security and
reduced fossil fuel expenditures will also play a role [32].
Our findings suggest that ambitious national climate policy
plans improve the case for front runner action, which
highlights again the close connection between the national
and international climate policy levels. They also suggest
that countries considering international leadership on
climate policy may look for coalition partners among
those countries that show a significant willingness to pay
in terms of their national climate action plans. Finally,
short-term co-benefits of climate policy in the presence of
multiple externalities can be a key element for tackling the
challenge presented by the short-term costs of mitigation.
Several caveats of this study need to be mentioned. First, the
results are contingent on the models that participated in this
study.While the use ofmultiplemodels in a comparison exercise
greatly improves the assessment of uncertainty due to different
model assumptions and structures, it cannot capture the full
range of uncertainty. Second, we have used a range of metrics to
explore the benefits (maximumand 2100 globalmeanwarming,
probability of exceeding two degrees) and costs (aggregate
mitigation costs, transitional costs, carbon price expenditures)
of climate action. While these cover key elements of
cost-benefit considerations, a full assessment of the costs
and benefits of climate policy will rely on a broader set of
indicators, including regional climate impacts, institutional
challenges, and co-benefits and adverse side effects. Third,
we approached the question of whether or not to act as a
front runner on climate policy, and whether or not to wait
with joining global action, in a scenario mode. While this is
the adequate choice for the large scale models with detailed
representations of the energy–economy system that were
used for this study, complementary analysis, including
game-theoretic modeling, is needed to explore the incen-
tive structure of staged accession. Finally, a representation
of the current climate policy landscape always runs the risk
of being overtaken by events, as the policy environment is
evolving rapidly.
Irrespective of these caveats, our study provides an
important analysis of how to bridge the current climate
policy situation and long term aspirations. Effective climate
policy leadership can play an important role in making or
breaking climate targets, if it helps to build expectations
about long term climate action, to exploit synergies with
other policy objectives, and to avoid extensive carbon
lock-ins over the next two decades.Acknowledgement
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